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ABSTRACT
This article outlines the main contours of Slovakia’s development
model from the perspective of regulationist and dependency
approaches. It identiﬁes ﬁnancialisation and export industrialization
as the two main pillars of the development model. The extremely
extraverted character of the development model entails signiﬁcant
external vulnerabilities. In addition, it is characterized by very
uneven internal development patterns. As a strategic alternative,
the article proposes the development of a third, more inward
looking pillar with a particular focus on the rather peripheral
regions.
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Slovakia is often cited as a success story of capitalist transformation strategically based on
export manufacturing industries. However, the recent global ﬁnancial crisis revealed the
structural vulnerabilities of Slovakia’s development model. Even erstwhile defenders of
the success narrative have started to admit at least some of the weaknesses of the
transformation process and the limitations of the resulting development model (e.g.
Baláž 2013; Šimečka 2014, 440 ﬀ.). This has opened more space for debate around
strategic alternatives to the present development model. Drawing on the theory of
régulation and the dependency approach, we will sketch the basic traits of the evolution
of the present Slovak development model and its structural vulnerabilities. From a critique
of the present model, we shall proceed to the presentation of possible strategic
alternatives.
Theorizing development: a régulationist and dependency focus
Both the theory of régulation and the dependency approach permit the analysis of
development models from the perspective of politico-economic theories which have
developed concepts at a medium degree of abstraction and which take history and
space seriously. Both approaches provide concepts for the systematic analysis of accu-
mulation processes and development models. Whereas the régulationist approach has
focused particularly on the relationship between productive and ﬁnancialised accumula-
tion and the forms of productive accumulation, the dependency approach has shed light
particularly into the external relations of a development model.
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Régulationists argue that forms of capital accumulation change over time and
display diﬀerent patterns in space. From a régulationist perspective, three axes of
accumulation can be distinguished: productive/ﬁnancialised accumulation, extensive/
intensive accumulation, introverted/extraverted accumulation (Becker 2002, 67). The
most fundamental distinction is between predominantly productive and predomi-
nantly ﬁnancialised accumulation. Investment can be focused on productive activities
or on ﬁnancial placements. As Arrighi (1994, 221) and Harvey (1984, 304, 324) argue,
increasingly ﬁnancialised accumulation has its roots in blocked productive accumula-
tion. In such a situation, capital searches for highly liquid and ﬂexible forms of
investment. Financial investments meet these requirements. They can take the form
either of “ﬁcticious capital”, i.e. shares, securities etc., or interest bearing capital, i.e.
credits (Becker et al. 2010, 228 ﬀ.). In the case of “ﬁcticious capital”, investors bank on
rapid increases in the value of shares, securities, real estate funds etc. They press for
policies that channel funds into ﬁnancial markets and stimulate prices. The privatiza-
tion of pension funds is one of those policies. Financial asset inﬂation is a basic trait of
this form of ﬁnancialisation. The increases in ﬁnancial asset prices tend to outstrip
both general price increases and the growth of proﬁts in the productive sectors.
Therefore, increasing imbalances emerge that ﬁnally lead to crises. Rapid credit
growth and a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between interest rates for deposits and credits
characterize the second form of ﬁnancialisation which tends to predominate in (semi-)
peripheral economies, including Eastern Europe. This form of ﬁnancialisation tends to
result in excessive burdens of debt, particularly private debt. Financialisation in (semi-)
peripheral economies is usually highly dependent on capital inﬂows from core
economies.
In the realm of productive accumulation, predominantly extensive and intensive
accumulation can be distinguished. The former relies on incorporating more workers
and prolonging the working day whereas intensive accumulation relies on increasing
labour productivity (cf. Aglietta 1982, 38 ﬀ.).
The spatial scale and the position in the international division of labour deﬁne the third
axis or dimension of accumulation. Accumulation might be inward- or outward-looking.
Inward-looking or introverted accumulation focuses on domestic markets. In the case of
outward-looking or extraverted accumulation, the position in the international division of
labour is of particular importance. “Dominant economies” tend to export goods and
capital whereas “dominated” or peripheral economies are highly dependent on imports
at least in key areas (Beaud 1987, 76). The availability of foreign exchange is a recurrent
external constraint on the accumulation processes in the periphery (cf. Ercan 2006). Crisis
processes in the periphery are often shaped by the external constraint and take the form
of current account, exchange rate and external debt crises. The combination of ﬁnancia-
lisation and high structural dependence on imports is particularly vulnerable to crisis since
it is extremely reliant on capital inﬂows. These are issues that have been extensively
debated by dependency theorists.
It is not just one of the axes, but their combination that deﬁnes the basic contours of
a development model. The basic traits of accumulation have a profound impact on the
conditions of social reproduction. A development model and speciﬁc forms of social
reproduction require the back-up of a ﬁtting dispositive of régulation, i.e. a set of social
and legal norms, policies etc. (cf. Becker 2002: 122 ﬀ.).
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Changing power blocs and property relations
The changes in property relations after the end of state socialism have shaped the
constellations of economic interests in Slovakia to a signiﬁcant extent. This change has
been characterized by two distinct phases. The attempt to build a “national capital-
creating stratum”, as it was called by the then Slovak Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar,
was dominant until the late 1990s (cf. Polák 2004; Drahokoupil 2009, 100 ﬀ.). With the
1998 change of government in Slovakia and the commencement of accession talks with
the EU, a second phase started in which foreign capital became predominant in the key
sectors of the Slovak economy, particularly banking and manufacturing industry. These
two phases were sustained by diﬀerent power blocs (cf. Becker 2016, 50 ﬀ.).
Part of the dominant bloc of late Czechoslovak state socialism was actually interested
in opening up venues for private accumulation, as Krejčí (2014, 23 ﬀ.) recently pointed
out. It was particularly the top management of state owned ﬁrms that could hope to ﬁnd
a place in the top echelons of a changed socio-economic order. This was probably one of
the reasons why the change from a state socialist to a capitalist order proved in the end to
be relatively “easy”. The question of who would control the privatization process and how
it would be organized was the key question of economic policy in the early transformation
phase. In the case of Czechoslovakia, this was a more complicated question than in other
Central East European countries owing to the federal structures of the ČSSR and the
competition between central and federal state structures over the control of the privati-
zation process. Indeed, diﬀerent party systems evolved in the two parts of Czechoslovakia.
And the dominant parties in the Czech lands and in Slovakia diﬀered on economic
policies, including privatization policies. However, the two formations which became
dominant in the early 1990s – the Czech Občanská demokraticka strana (Civic
Democratic Party – ODS) and the Slovak Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko (Movement
for a Democratic Slovakia – HZDS) – converged in their interest in building a “national
bourgeoisie” (cf. Drahokoupil 2009, 101). The notion of the “national” implied Czech or
Slovak respectively. This was the key economic background to the division of
Czechoslovakia which was negotiated by the ODS and HZDS.
After Slovak independence, the Slovak government parted with the coupon privatiza-
tion method which had been adopted during the ﬁrst Czechoslovak wave of privatization.
Instead, it switched to direct sales. “With the government aim of strengthening the
domestic business stratum and of preventing the sale of national property abroad,
domestic businessmen, especially among the management of the privatized state enter-
prises, became the hegemon of privatization”, conclude Hallon and Sabol (2013, 404). It
was particularly businessmen close to the governing HZDS who gained from the privati-
zation processes of the 1990s (cf. Žiak 1998, chap. 3). Initially, the activities of the domestic
capital groups were focused on industrial activities. Therefore, Drahokoupil (2009, 110)
sees domestic industrial capital at the core of the power bloc during the Mečiar years.
However, diversiﬁed ﬁnance holdings already started to play an increasingly important
role among domestic capital groups during the 1990s (Brzica 2006). This trend continued
into the 2000s. Today, it is diversiﬁed ﬁnancial holdings like Penta and J&T which have
a dominant position among domestic capital. Through the partial attenuation of social
hardships, the Mečiar government attempted – with some success – to incorporate
segments of the popular classes into its political project. “Thus, what Mečiar represented,
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was in eﬀect a cross-class-alliance between a section of the ‘losers’ (the workers and the
pensioners) and the ‘winners’ (the old managerial strata and other ‘industrial’ privatizers)
of the transition, united, despite their opposing interests, by the need to face a much
stronger opponent in the shape of Western capital and its institutional forms (chieﬂy the
IMF/WB and the European Union.” (Polák 2004, 73)
The EU expressed its discontent with this policy orientation and with what it perceived
as an “illiberal” tendency by excluding Slovakia from the ﬁrst group of countries with
which EU accession talks were started. External donors, particularly US foundations,
started to fund neo-liberal think tanks in Slovakia. Exclusion from Western integration
processes – from the EU to NATO – coalesced opposition to the Mečiar government.
Ahead of the 1998 parliamentary election, a broad-based anti-Mečiar alliance, the Slovak
Democratic Coalition (SDK), which included both various right-wing parties and some
minor left-wing ones was formed. Although Mečiar’s party still managed to scrape to an
election victory in 1998, the social democratic Strana demokratickej ľavice (Democratic
Left Party – SDL) in the end decided to join the predominantly right-wing SDK in
government, rather than support the continuation of Mečiar’s rule. The SDK had particu-
larly strong support among the (upper) middle strata of the urban centres Bratislava and
Košice. As in other Central East European countries, the orientation towards EU accession
implied the rise of the “comprador service sector” as denominated by Drahokoupil (2007,
101). “This sector includes state oﬃcials from FDI-related bodies, local branches of global
consulting and legal advisory ﬁrms and their local competitors, and companies providing
other services to foreign investors. The power bloc also integrates signiﬁcant fractions of
domestic capital which are becoming increasingly internationalized and/or subordinated
to international investors.” (Drahokoupil 2007, 101). Thus, the composition of the power
bloc changed signiﬁcantly. The EU used its leverage during the EU accession talks in order
to promote the interests of foreign (West European) capital and to strengthen the
domestic sectors close to foreign capital.
The new coalition, led by Mikuláš Dzurinda, accelerated the privatization processes and
adopted neo-liberal policies favourable to foreign capital and the domestic ﬁnancial
holdings. These neo-liberal directions were radicalized during the second Dzurinda
government which consisted only of right-wing parties after the SDL had failed to win
parliamentary representation in the 2002 elections, one of the reasons being its previous
support for neo-liberal policies or at least ineﬀective resistance to them when in
government.
The privatization of the banking sector whose bad credits were transferred to a “bad
bank” proceeded in a particularly rapid and radical way. Already in 2003, the asset share of
foreign-owned banks amounted to 96.3% (Frangakis 2009, 72). Thus, the crucial banking
sector is almost completely dominated by external banks (particularly from Austria and
Italy). Foreign capital took over some key industrial companies as well. However, reloca-
tion of parts of manufacturing production, particularly by West European companies, has
led to substantial greenﬁeld investment as well (Hallon and Sabol 2013, 426 ﬀ.). In 2007,
the share of foreign companies in industrial production reached 72.3%. Their share in
manufacturing employment was somewhat lower – 51.6%. Whereas the share of foreign
capital in industrial production has stabilized at around 70% in subsequent years, its share
in employment increased to 59.1% in 2010 (Šikula 2013, 452, tab. 61). Thus, foreign capital
is dominant in the key manufacturing sector as well.
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Foreign capital also gained control over basic infrastructure (e.g. in the energy sector)
through privatization policies. However, domestic capital groups could take advantage of
the privatization of material or social infrastructure – either in consortia with foreign
companies in large undertakings or alone – as well. The privatization and commercializa-
tion of social security, in particular in the pension system and in the health system,
opened new areas for business both for transnational corporations and local ﬁnancial
holdings like Penta (Hallon and Sabol 2013, 437). As Hallon and Sabol (2013, 407) observe,
“(t)he sale of strategic infrastructure enterprises or enterprises in other sectors was often
realized below their real value and was often connected with clientelism.”
Domestic capital is particularly active in (sub-)sectors that are not strongly exposed to
international competition, like real estate and health services.
The social-democratically inclined Smer emerged as the strongest party from the 2006
parliamentary elections, and was able to form a coalition government. Smer has governed
with the exception of a brief interval since that time. It has taken a more reserved position
towards privatization, has amended labour legislation in favour of workers and trade
unions and has attenuated the anti-social character of welfare policies (cf. Blaha 2013, 4
ﬀ.). The strongly anti-social character of the right-wing governments was the key reason
for the electoral defeats of the neo-liberal right both in the 2006 and 2012 parliamentary
elections. As Gál (2013) admits, the neo-liberal policies had been pushed through “against
the will of the majority”. Thus, the position of the power bloc around the comprador
service class has been eroded over recent years. While tax, labour and social policies have
followed a somewhat more progressive direction than in the years before, the strategic
orientation towards FDI has remained basically in place.
Contours of Slovakia’s development model
As in other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the Slovak economy suﬀered from
a severe recession during the early phase of transformation in the early 1990s. The
recession lasted until 1993. Industry was at the core of the development model of the
1990s. The drop in industrial production during the initial phase of the transition process
was relatively low in Slovakia though stronger than in the Czech lands. The real volume of
industrial production decreased by 25% between 1989 and 1995. In 2000, industrial
production had almost recovered its 1989 volume (cf. Becker 2010, 28). However, some
sub-sectors and regions suﬀered from severe de-industrialization. This applies particularly
to the armaments industry and parts of the machinery industry. It was especially regions
in the centre and the east of the country with mono-branch structures that were aﬀected
(cf. Smith 1998, 258 ﬀ.). The state stabilized industry to some extent through providing
credits from state-owned banks and by providing ﬁnance through special funds. Whereas
Slovakia had displayed a current account surplus amounting to 2% of GDP in 1995, the
deﬁcit jumped to more than 9% of GDP in 1996 and stayed above 9% until 1998 (Myant
and Drahokoupil 2011, tab. A13). This was clearly beyond a sustainable level. The high
current account deﬁcit implied ballooning external debt. Although the growth rate of real
GDP oscillated between 4.2% and 6.2% between 1994 and 1998 (ibid: tab. A2), unemploy-
ment only receded slightly and surpassed 11% in every year between 1994 and 1998
(Šikula 2013, 445, tab. 55). In the East, the South and a signiﬁcant part of the centre, the
unemployment rate was even higher. Until 1998, the development model was primarily
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based on productive accumulation and showed an increasing tendency towards import
dependence. The current account deﬁcit was an external constraint.
The Dzurinda government dealt with this external constraint by devaluing the
currency strongly in December 1998 and by taking austerity measures which con-
strained mass demand and dampened imports. The current account improved tempora-
rily, but the GDP growth rate went down to 1.5% and 2.0% in 1999 and 2000 (Myant and
Drahokoupil 2011, tab. A2). The Dzurinda government then opted for a strategy of FDI-
led growth. This change of economic policy orientation had been prepared by neo-
liberal think-tanks, like M.E.S.A. 10, which were closely linked to the right-wing govern-
ing parties, in particular SDKU (the main descendant of the SDK coalition). In line with
the thinking of the European Commission and international ﬁnancial institutions, it
made the attraction of FDI the central plank of its economic policies. Accordingly, the
Dzurinda governments, particularly the more homogeneously right-wing government
of the years 2002 to 2006, accelerated the privatization of enterprises (banks, infra-
structure etc.), amended labour legislation in favour of business, provided strong stimuli
to foreign investors and amended tax legislation in favour of corporations and high
income groups. The introduction of a ﬂat tax of 19% both in the case of income tax and
of VAT is extremely regressive – and was perceived as a model case by neo-liberal
economists (cf. Hofbauer and Noack 2013, 149 ﬀ., Drahokoupil 2009, 46 ﬀ., Hallon and
Sabol 2013, 406 ﬀ.). The second Smer government which governed from 2012 to 2016
attenuated this extremely regressive tax structure. In particular, it abolished the ﬂat tax
(cf. Blaha 2013, 4 ﬀ.). However, taxation levels in Slovakia have remained very low. In
2011, tax revenue (including social security contributions) amounted only to 28.8% of
GDP – compared with an EU-27 average of 40% (Joossens and Wahrig 2012, 5, tab. 1).
Low taxation has structurally constrained the capacity of the Slovak state to pursue pro-
active economic and social policies. This was actually the intention of the right-wing
parties. The second Dzurinda government initiated radical steps towards the privatiza-
tion and commercialization of social security and social services, in particular in pension
insurance and in the health services (Hofbauer and Noack 2013, 152, Lesay 2006).
FDI, indeed, did increase between 2000 and 2008. Manufacturing came ﬁrst with
a share of 36% in the 2008 FDI stock. Financial intermediation followed with a share of
19.7%. The share of real estate, renting and business services – a complex with close links
to ﬁnancialisation – was 10.9% and thus very substantial. The shares of the energy sector
and commerce were comparable to real estate and related services (Hunya 2012, 100: tab.
II/9.1.A). The patterns of FDI clearly deﬁne the two pillars of the post-2000 Slovak devel-
opment model: ﬁnancialisation and export manufacturing.
The provision of credits to the private sector, in particular households, has been at the
core of the ﬁnancialisation process in Slovakia. Although starting from a particularly low
level, the provision of credits to the household sector was the strongest among the
Visegrád countries between 2004 and 2008. The annual growth rate amounted to
35.5%. The ratio of the stock of household credits to GDP increased from 5.6% in 2004
to 18.9% in 2009 (Becker and Ćetković 2015, tab. 4). The household credits were over-
whelmingly destined for housing – about 70% of them were used in this way.
Consumption credits accounted only for 15.7% of household credits in 2008 (ibid.:
tab. 5). The rapidly increasing provision of housing credits produced a real estate
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boom – house prices increased between 15% and 25% per year until 2008. A housing
bubble was in the making in the immediate pre-crisis years (Becker et al. 2010, 241).
As in the other Visegrád countries and in Slovenia, export manufacturing has been
the second pillar of Slovakia’s development model. Manufacturing growth has been
highly reliant on foreign capital. Industrial production in Slovakia reached about 150%
of its 1989 value in 2008 (Becker et al 2010, 28, Landesmann 2010, 2). The share of
manufacturing in GDP has declined only slightly over the years and is presently still
about 20%.
The composition of both manufacturing in general and manufacturing exports has
changed dramatically since the late 1990s. This has been mainly due to the relocation of
production, particularly in the automobile industry and in the manufacturing of radios, TV
and communication equipment. It is these two branches which have attracted consider-
able FDI and have increased strongly their share of both production and exports. The
share of the three largest classes of exports, namely cars, electronic consumer goods and
machines increased from 26.0% to 53.2% of total exports between 1995 and 2012 (Baláž
2013, 579). Thus, the production and export proﬁle is extremely narrow. This narrow
specialization proﬁle implies signiﬁcant vulnerability to crisis.
The technological proﬁle of production has become stronger – at least seemingly.
A closer look at the structural features of the main manufacturing branches reveals serious
weaknesses however. First of all, there are enormous diﬀerences between the technolo-
gical proﬁles of externally- and domestically owned businesses. As Gabrielová (2013, 55,
tab. 4) shows, “technologically demanding” production predominates in foreign-owned
manufacturing companies with a share of 55.7%. In the case of domestically-owned
manufacturing ﬁrms, the share of “technologically less demanding” production is 81.3%
and is thus overwhelming. Externally- and domestically owned enterprises are hardly
interlinked. Their productivity diﬀers signiﬁcantly. Therefore, Baláž (2013, 568) charac-
terizes Slovakia’s industrial structure as “dual”. Secondly, export production is extremely
dependent on imported inputs as the foreign trade statistics reveal. Thirdly, technology is
likewise largely imported. The R&D expenditure of companies has hovered at around
0.18% and 0.25% of GDP between 2004 and 2008 (Morvay et al. 2012, 42, tab. 13) and
increased minimally to 0.33% of GDP in 2013 (Morvay et al. 2016, 23, tab. 2.1). In Slovakia,
transnational corporations usually did not continue R & D in pre-existing privatized
companies (Baláž 2013, 573). Low wages have been one of the main attractors of FDI.
After the steep decline of real wages in the early 1990s, wage recovery has been slower in
Slovakia than in most other new EU member states and slower than in the other Visegrád
countries. The average real wage level of 1989 was only reached in 2007 – one year before
the crisis. In 2012, average real wages reached just 105% of the 1989 level (Gabrielová
2013, 56, tab. 6). Average monthly wage costs reached 24% of the Austrian level in 2010
(ibid., 56). This low wage level is clearly a strong restriction on the domestic market.
FDI is geographically highly concentrated in the West of the country, primarily in
Bratislava which had a share of 70% in 2012 (Morvay et al. 2015, 37). The FDI stock in
the Bratislava local govenernment region (kraj) was 15 times higher than the average of
the other Slovak regions in 2010. FDI is particularly low in the Banská Bystrica and Prešov
regions in the centre and the east of the country respectively (Morvay et al. 2012, 75 ﬀ.)
Enormous regional disparities in unemployment rates – between around 5% in Bratislava
and close to 20% in the Košice region and above 15% in the regions of Banská Bystrica and
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Prešov (Menbere et al. 2014, 114, graph 3.31) are the reverse side of the coin. Average
wages display similar disparities. In 2012, the average monthly wage in the Bratislava
region was €1029 compared with a nation-wide average of € 805 and only €613 in Prešov,
the region with the lowest wages (Morvay et al. 2013, 62, graph 4.4). The regional patterns
of poverty follow similar lines and poverty is particularly high in Prešov (cf. Želinský 2014,
115 ﬀ.). Thus, Slovakia shows very uneven regional development patterns even though it
is a relatively small country; the present pattern of industrial development is obviously not
able to contribute signiﬁcantly to a solution of Slovakia’s persistent regional unemploy-
ment problem.
The sectoral composition of both production and exports has become more concen-
trated over the years. The share of automobiles, electronic consumer goods and machin-
ery in exports had increased signiﬁcantly by 2012 as discussed above (Baláž 2013, 579).
This narrow specialization proved to be very problematic during the crisis when the
strong contraction of exports produced a strong decline in GDP during late 2008 and
early 2009 (Becker and Lesay 2012, 132 ﬀ.). With the recovery of German export industries,
Slovak export manufacturing recovered relatively early as well. It has, however, been
exports to countries outside the Eurozone that have recovered most strongly. Although
the vulnerability of the model is perceived more acutely now than before the crisis (e.g.
Baláž 2013; Morvay et al. 2016, 45), there has so far been no change in the basic
orientation of the outward looking model (Becker and Lesay 2012, 140).
The 2008/2009 crisis and its consequences
Slovakia was lucky that the international crisis began only in 2007/2008 – and not before.
Although the industrial growth strategy was export-orientated, Slovakia still incurred high
current account deﬁcits in the mid-2000s. In 2005, the current account deﬁcit still reached
8.7% of GDP (Becker and Lesay 2012, 125). Thus Slovakia was highly dependent on foreign
capital inﬂows at that time, and external vulnerability was extremely signiﬁcant. By 2008,
the current account deﬁcit had declined to a more manageable, though still critical level
of 6.6% of GDP (Morvay et al. 2012, 69, tab. 17). High proﬁt remittances were the main
reason for the current account deﬁcit, although in addition to this the trade balance was
still in the red at that time.
When the crisis came to Central Eastern Europe, Slovakia was initially harder hit than
Poland and the Czech Republic, but not as strongly as Hungary. The Slovakian GDP fell by
4.9% in 2009, compared with a slight GDP growth of 1.6% in Poland and with GDP
declines of 4.7% in the Czech Republic and of 6.8% in Hungary (Myant, Drahokoupil,
and Lesay 2013, 386, tab. 1). The relatively large contraction of Slovak GDP has its roots in
the particularly strong decline of exports in 2009. They suﬀered from a reduction of 14.8%
in that year – the largest among the Visegrád countries (ibid). The strong export decline
can be attributed to two main factors: narrow export specialization and inability to
devalue the currency. The export specialization of Slovak manufacturing industry is
even narrower than in the other Visegrád countries. This renders the economy particularly
vulnerable to any contraction in key export markets. In addition, the car industry is the key
sub-sector of Slovak export manufacturing, and this sub-sector was particularly strongly
aﬀected by the crisis (Becker and Lesay 2012, 133). As Slovakia adopted the euro at the
beginning of 2009, it could not devalue its currency. In addition, the conversion rate of the
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Slovak koruna had appreciated relatively shortly before the adoption of the euro. This
measure, which it has been argued was beneﬁcial for the banking sector, as a result of its
dampening eﬀect on inﬂation, was much less beneﬁcial for manufacturing industries,
particularly domestically-owned ﬁrms facing competition from abroad (cf. Becker and
Lesay 2012, 128 ﬀ.).
The Slovak government – then led by Smer – reacted relatively swiftly and in consulta-
tion with business associations and trade unions. Since there was no need to take
stabilizing measures for the banking sector, the measures were primarily targeted at
sustaining demand. Several sub-sector speciﬁc measures were taken as well (Becker and
Lesay 2012, 138; Myant, Drahokoupil, and Lesay 2013, 399 ﬀ.). As Filadelﬁová (2010, 52)
points out, sector support was primarily targeted at sectors with a predominantly male
labour force, like construction. The shortening of working hours during the crisis was,
however, less traditional in design (Myant, Drahokoupil, and Lesay 2013, 400 ﬀ.). The right-
wing coalition which was formed after the 2010 elections abandoned the anti-crisis
policies. It rapidly foundered, however, on the issue of the euro zone rescue packages.
After early elections in 2012, the government was again formed by Smer, which tried to
stabilize the incomes of lower income workers. Smer’s ﬁscal and wage policies, which
have been more socially balanced and less restrictive than in the Czech Republic, explain
at least partially the better post-2009 performance of the Slovak economy (cf. Becker
2014, 23). Apart from Poland, Slovakia was the only East European EU member country in
which GDP was higher in 2012 than the pre-crisis maximum (Dymarski 2014, 93, tab. 4.1).
However, as indicated above, though social-democratically inclined Smer-
governments have pursued ﬁscal, social and wage policies which tend to be more
progressive than those of their predecessors, the strategic orientation of the economic
development model has not been changed. Financialisation temporarily slowed down.
However, credits to households have continued to grow without any interruption. From
2009 to 2012, they increased by 7.95% per year. This was a stronger growth than in any of
the other Visegrád countries. The stock of private household debt increased from 18.86%
of GDP to 26.38% of GDP (Becker and Ćetković 2015, 81, tab. 5). The growth of debt has
accelerated over the years. Borrowing continues to be destined primarily for buying ﬂats –
to a great extent due to the sell-oﬀ of the government, local government and cooperative
housing stock at knock-down prices at the beginning of the 1990s, resulting in a close to
non-existent rental housing sector.
Slovak exports declined very strongly – by 14.8% – in 2009. The recovery in the
following years was relatively strong as well. Growth rates of 10.6% and 16.9% were
recorded in 2010 and 2011 (Myant, Drahokoupil, and Lesay 2013, 385, tab. 1). It was
particularly exports in speciﬁc sub-sectors, like cars, that rebounded. The rebound of
exports was stronger than that of imports. Therefore, the balance of payments tempora-
rily improved. The trade balance became positive in 2009 and has tended to be in surplus
in most subsequent years (Morvay et al. 2013, 55, tab. 5.1., 2016, 38, tab. 3.1). Due to high
proﬁt remittances, the income balance has become a heavy drain on the current account.
After several years with a positive current account, this turned into the red in 2015. In
that year, the current account deﬁcit reached 1.3% of GDP (Morvay et al. 2016, 38, tab. 3.1).
Although the EU remained the dominant destination for exports, sales of manufactured
goods to markets outside the euro zone recovered more strongly than those to the euro
zone (Morvay et al. 2013, 32, tab. 2.3, 2015, 34, graph 3.2). Thus, the strong austerity
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 9
policies of the EU have had a (dampening) eﬀect on Slovak exports. The big transnational
car manufacturers in Slovakia have re-orientated their sales to some extent to non – EU
markets, e.g. Volkswagen to China, Kia to Russia. PSA Peugeot Citroën which has been
particularly strongly orientated to some peripheral countries of the euro zone that have
very strongly aﬀected by crisis and austerity has made fewer advances in re-orientating its
exports (ibid.: 69). In spite of the recovery of manufacturing exports, employment in
manufacturing has fallen in most years since the beginning of the crisis. In 2012, manu-
facturing employment reached 449.000 which is considerably lower than the 2008
employment level of 533.000 (ibid., 29, tab. 2.2). In 2014, manufacturing employment
started to show a marked increase (Morvay et al. 2016, 92 ﬀ.).
The question of strategic alternatives
As Weissenbacher (2014) argues, neo-classical and even Keynesian development econo-
mists perceive the barriers to development as internal and expect solutions from abroad.
On the other hand, the economists who have dealt with questions of regional develop-
ment in Europe and have been inspired by critical Latin American development theories
(like structuralism and dependency theory) have pointed out that foreign-led develop-
ment strategies (implying structural dependence on decisions, technology and capital
made outside the region) have usually not been capable of surmounting the centre-
periphery divide and that domestic forces of development should be nurtured instead.
In these approaches advocating “development from below” of the 1970s and 1980s,
the necessity for a “selective territorial closure” was underlined (Weissenbacher 2014;
Friedman and Weaver 1979; Nohlen and Schultze 1985, 61 ﬀ.). This selective territorial
closure was intended to enable local actors to strengthen local productive capacities.
However, local actors in peripheral regions who are directly linked to productive activities
have become weaker rather than stronger in the neo-liberal era.
Several decades later, the present crisis has revealed that growth strategies in the EU
which had banked on trade integration, monetary integration and on FDI have either
resulted in a further weakening of manufacturing structures (South and Southeast
Europe) or in highly vulnerable and usually regionally very unevenly developed export
industries (Visegrád countries). Basic elements of the analysis put forward by economists
advocating “development from below” still seem to be pertinent. However, the question
of who might engage in favour of alternative strategies is particularly vexing, and Slovakia
is no exception to that. The strong electoral growth of the extreme right in some of the
poorer regions of Slovakia, like Banská Bystrica, has led to an incipient rethinking of the
approach to regional development. Before the last general elections, the Smer govern-
ment had already initiated a new approach to local development, particularly in poorer
regions, which aimed at developing local sources of development (cf. Krivošík 2016). The
new approach has been tested in a few municipalities. In a recent publication looking at
public perceptions of socio-economic and political problems, interviewees from poorer
Slovak regions expressed serious doubts about policies geared at improving the business
environment and rather saw a need for direct (local) intervention of the state in order to
tackle unemployment (Báboš, Világi, and Oravcová 2016, 126 ﬀ.). Uneasiness with FDI-
reliant strategies has, however, not translated into more direct pressures.
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Assessing the Slovak development model of the last 15 years in particular, one can say
it has been characterized by excessive reliance on FDI, skewed industrial export structures,
high external vulnerabilities, regionally very uneven development patterns and highly
persistent regional unemployment. Strategic alternatives will have to tackle these struc-
tural problems. It seems essential to make the Slovak economy less reliant on FDI, more
inward-looking and more evenly developed.
It is crucial in this context to distinguish between the concepts of growth and devel-
opment. They can overlap to some extent but standard growth paradigms have made the
mistake of presenting them as being identical. The critique of such a view is decades old.
Seers (1979, 25) argues that the correct criterion for judging policy is not whether it
accelerates growth but rather its impact on structural change, especially reduction of
regional inequalities. Stöhr (in Weissenbacher 2014) concurs that instead of maximizing
the return to selected factors of production, a proper development strategy should focus
on increasing the overall eﬃciency of all factors of production of less developed regions in
an integrated fashion.
Similar views still have not made it to the economic mainstream; however, some major
economic policy institutions have launched a learning process after the crisis. For example
the OECD’s initiative New Approaches to Economic Challenges is unprecedentedly critical
of prevalent economic models and analytical approaches, and aims at deﬁning more
eﬀective policy options that align growth, social, environment and other policy objectives
(OECD 2014).
However, the socio-political conditions for such strategies have become ever more
diﬃcult over the last three to four decades. The EU acquis communautaire, in particular EU
policies regarding competition and trade, has drastically narrowed the space for devel-
opment strategies from below. Another limit is posed by the European ﬁscal rules (the
Stability and Growth Pact) and the common monetary policy for the Euro Area Member
States.
Again, the limits and dilemmas of EU/eurozone membership for peripheral regions
were clear decades ago (Seers 1979,27; Commission of the European Communities 1977).
Already existing regional inequalities tend to be exacerbated in the absence of national
policy instruments, such as tariﬀs, quotas, exchange controls, devaluation, or ﬁscal stimuli.
This loss of policy instruments would not represent a major problem if regional inequality
and polarization in Europe were mitigated by a suﬃciently signiﬁcant pan-European ﬁscal
redistribution system. Since reclaiming the national policy tools mentioned above would
go against the basic European principles set in stone by EU Treaties, it follows that small,
peripheral and low-income countries such as Slovakia should strategically call for mone-
tary union to be complemented by a signiﬁcantly more substantial ﬁscal capacity (Lesay,
Polák, and Auxt 2013). In addition, long-term eﬀorts towards loosening EU constraints, e.g.
on public investment, tendering etc., would be essential in order to create policy spaces
for alternative policies.
Besides this strategic preference in the international arena, what are the other –
perhaps more practical and feasible – options for overcoming the era of “growth without
development” in Slovakia? Deﬁnitely a stronger focus will need to be given to internal
sources of development and growth. As Weissenbacher (2014) puts it, production and
distribution should focus on regional needs and be based as much as possible on regional
resources. Even in a simple neoclassical equation, output is a function of total-factor
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productivity, capital, and labour. Increasing TFP is an important yet complex and long-
term process. Given the controversial impact of foreign capital described above, and
given the persistently high unemployment in Slovakia, it appears obvious that ways to
employ domestic capital and labour should be given much greater attention in eﬀorts to
enhance not only growth but primarily development, too.
Trying to develop internal sources of development is a challenge in an FDI dominated
and extremely open (and thus vulnerable) economy. The Oﬃce of the Government of the
Czech Republic rightly points out in its analysis (2014) that transition of an economy is
a failure if the country is not able to retain a higher share of gains from foreign capital and
use this to build domestic sources of capital. If capital outﬂow (FDI proﬁt repatriation) is
not compensated for by new sources and the economy is permanently dependent on
foreign investment, its growth potential decreases. The authors suggest that policies
should be developed to increase the non-ﬁnancial beneﬁts of FDI (technology- and know-
how transfer); and even more importantly, that the labour share of proﬁt should increase:
i.e. higher local wages should be the tool used to retain capital gains and limit outﬂows
(The Oﬃce of the Government of the Czech Republic 2014, 33).
Slovakia has the potential to increase wage levels. It has been a structural problem of
the Slovak economy that real wage growth signiﬁcantly lags behind productivity growth.
The wage share of GDP had been falling before the crisis and is currently relatively low if
compared with richer EU or OECD economies. Reversing these trends would contribute to
stronger domestic demand and increased resilience of national income to foreign
demand shocks.
There are several ways for governments to carry out such a higher-wage policy. It can
increase the minimum wage level and/or public sector wages – both of these measures
should push private sector wages upwards, too. As the example of education shows,
underfunding can have detrimental eﬀects on the qualiﬁcations of the labour force. As in
the case of other underfunded social services which pay extremely low wages to their
(predominantly female) employees, funding and the wage level in education should be
increased. Wage policies are thus obviously not just a matter of quantity (boosting
domestic demand), but also of quality and enhancing long-term development potential.
The resulting increase in state budget expenditure should be compensated by increas-
ing tax revenues by more eﬀective collection and/or increased rates and by new taxes.
Low taxation is a key cause of the weaknesses of the public sector and limits the scope for
public investment. Therefore, making income taxes more progressive and increasing
property and corporate taxes seems to be essential. A higher level of redistribution (in
other words a rise in both revenues and expenditures as a ratio to GDP), say to the EU
average level, would represent an eﬀective contribution to a sustainable post-crisis model
of development.
Another relatively obvious way to enhance development (and growth, too) is to
increase labour force participation. That is not a controversial policy proposal; however,
the quality and sources of this new employment matter a lot. The issue of where it is most
advisable to support employment cannot be addressed separately from the question of
which sectors are strategically important for “development from below” as such, including
all its facets.
In general, “selective self-reliance” should be built on a set of principles, such as priority
for sectoral and functional diversiﬁcation with a higher level of resilience to external
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shocks and emphasis on inter-sectoral development, priority for the satisfaction of
regional needs (food, housing, basic needs) and facilitation of self-suﬃciency in times of
crisis, and the mobilizing of regional energy resources (Stöhr in Weissenbacher 2014). It
seems to be of particular importance to strengthen productive capacities – both in
industry and agriculture – in the more peripheral regions of Slovakia, particularly in the
East, South and centre of the country. This production should be primarily geared towards
the domestic, especially local market. As Švihlíková (2011, 54) points out, “local produc-
tion can not only support structurally weaker regions, but can also in a synergetic way
support employment.”
One key area of such amodiﬁed (employment/investment/energy) strategy should be the
renewal of buildings with the aim of increasing energy eﬃciency, and support for
a decentralized and sustainable use of renewable energy sources. This can be carried out
using viable revolving measures with long-term returns that have direct economic and social
impacts. Supporting this labour-intensive sector implies an immediate increase in the num-
ber of jobs in construction, use of mainly local material inputs, and higher general govern-
ment revenue. Other beneﬁts include regional distribution and local development, decreased
dependence on imports of energy commodities, and the impact on climate change.
Secondly, social economy could be a means of supporting local production. This sector
is somewhere between the public and private sectors – ﬁnancial proﬁt is not sought here;
yet social enterprises should be viable (able to sustain and reproduce themselves) to be
able to follow social goals, primarily, though not exclusively, that of employment (Polák
and Schinglerová 2014). For example, agriculture and food production start-up compa-
nies in less developed regions of Slovakia, aiming at employing the previously long-term
unemployed, should be supported by grants and later by revolving instruments, such as
micro-credits. In addition, tenders for public institutions could be designed in a way which
would support local production with speciﬁc social and ecological characteristics, e.g. in
supplying food to schools and public canteens.
In addition to ﬁnancing a decentralized energy strategy and social economy, public
investment should be channelled to smaller projects – and more peripheral regions (cf.
Marcon and Pianta 2013, 89 ﬀ. on the Italian case). Local infrastructures could be
strengthened in that way. Such a refocusing could render the infrastructure more ecolo-
gical and could address the deﬁcits in the peripheral regions. Public housing programmes
could put a brake on the emerging real estate bubble, would make ﬂats more accessible
for the poorer population strata and would reduce one of the basic barriers to inter-
regional mobility. In order to ﬁnance such regional economic undertakings, national
development funding institutions – which already do exist in a basic state – should be
strengthened.
The question of how to fund the mentioned strategic initiatives is, of course, pertinent.
It has already been indicated that the tax system needs to be revamped in order to bring
more revenues for ﬁnancing priorities. European Structural and Investment Funds should
be directed to these sectors, too. And even taking into consideration the strict European
and national limits on public budgets (which it is to be hoped should be at least loosened
in the medium- to long-term), somemanoeuvring space can be created by reprioritisation
of expenditures. Particularly in the Slovak case, the costly pension privatization has no
positive economic or development impact and should be reversed – this could immedi-
ately untie as much as 1 % of GDP annually (Lesay 2014).
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The strategic considerations, as well as practical suggestions, outlined in the text above
represent a major shift in policy practice. Such a re-orientation is a complicated and long-
term undertaking that will face considerable obstacles. Steps in that direction would,
however, be economically feasible right now.
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